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1.   Introduction 
 
In economics the conventional method adopted to model a decision making problem is to 
list the set of alternatives from which the decision maker makes his choice. The act of 
choice is represented by a function that associates to every menu of options one or more 
of its chosen alternatives. Such a function is usually referred to as a choice 
correspondence. In such a situation, rationalization of choice is often considered to be a 
significant issue. While in common parlance rationalization would mean a reasoned 
justification, in choice theory its meaning is more specific. A rational agent is one whose 
act of choice results from some kind of optimizing behavior. 
Much of choice theory assumes that given a finite set of alternatives, any non-empty 
finite subset of it could serve as a menu of options for the decision maker. In a sense such 
a standpoint is at variance with the origins of choice theory. In classical consumer choice 
theory from where a lot of choice theory arose, it is normally assumed that the consumer 
chooses from well defined budget sets. The collection of budget sets is a strict subset of 
the collection of non-empty subsets of the commodity space. The domain of a demand 
function is assumed to consist of budget sets only. One of the more complete discussions 
on choices on general domains (which allow for some sets to be excluded from 
consideration) can be found in Suzumura (1983). However there are equally significant 
situations, where it makes sense to consider the collection of all non-empty subsets as the 
domain of decision making. We shall not enter into the debate concerning whether it is or 
it is not reasonable to allow choices to be made from all subsets of a given set of 
alternatives. Our approach to the issue will be somewhat different. 
There are two ways in which we can describe the domain of a demand function. The first 
and more conventional method is to say that a demand function is defined on all budget 
sets. The alternative approach is to say that a demand function is defined on all non-
empty subsets of the commodity space but disallows choices from (or assigns the empty 
set to) subsets which are not a budget set. In a similar vein there are two ways in which 
we can define a choice correspondence. In the first approach we are given a collection of 
subsets over which the choice correspondence is defined. In the second approach the 
choice correspondence which is defined over all non-empty subsets disallows the act of 
choice from some (if any) non-empty subsets. Whether the set of choices from a given 
subset of alternatives is empty or not, is a property of the choice correspondence under 
consideration. The latter approach is what Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) adopts to 
define a choice correspondence although the more significant results therein are 
established under the additional assumption that the decision maker does make non-
empty choices from every non-empty subset of alternatives.     
In this paper we consider choice correspondences that select (a possibly empty) subset 
from each nonempty subset of alternatives. Choice theory often considers functions that 
select exactly one alternative from each non-empty subset of alternatives. Such functions 
which are special cases of choice correspondences are naturally known as choice 
functions. The general idea of a choice correspondence is one that models a first stage in 
a choice procedure to be followed later by a second selection process that is based on 
some tie-breaking rule. Choice correspondences allow for greater flexibility. A particular 
type of a choice correspondence that some refer to as a “resolute” choice function allows 
at most one alternative to be chosen from every pair of alternatives. Given that this 
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paper’s concerns are about conditions under which choice correspondences are rational, if 
we assume that the choice correspondence is a resolute choice function then we will 
eventually be in a situation where at most one alternative is chosen from every non-empty 
set of alternatives.  
As in much of economic theory where non-market phenomena are analyzed by methods 
which are initially motivated by models concerned with the market, our paper will 
concern itself with choice situations that may be far removed from consumer choice 
theory although we have appealed to the latter in an earlier paragraph. Unlike consumer 
choice theory, sets comprising two elements will play a central role in this paper.  
Further unlike consumer choice theory and much else that it motivates, we shall only 
consider a universal set of alternatives that is finite. Thus our paper is rooted in the 
tradition of choice theory that formally began with the seminal paper by Arrow (1959).  
A type of choice correspondence we consider here is assumed to satisfy a “base domain 
property”. This property is very similar to the one by the same name introduced by 
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2006), where it was assumed that the domain of a 
choice correspondence includes all one and two element subsets of the universal set of 
alternatives. On the other hand what we mean by “base domain property” is that the 
choice correspondence succeeds in choosing from all singletons and pairs of alternatives. 
Subsequently we invoke a weaker version of the base domain property that requires that 
given any subset of alternatives, choice is possible from each pair comprising a chosen 
alternative and an alternative in the subset. In the latter case all pairs need not allow non-
empty choices. We call this property “weak base domain property”. 
A question that we are concerned with in this paper is the following. Given a choice 
correspondence is there a reflexive binary relation such that a chosen alternative from a 
subset of alternatives is at least as good as all other alternatives from the subset? Choice 
correspondences for which such a binary relation exists are called “partially rational”. If 
in addition the binary relation is complete (i.e. comparable over all pairs of alternatives) 
then we call such a choice correspondence “rational”. If the choice correspondence is at 
most single-valued i.e. a choice function, then in the latter case the binary relation that 
rationalizes the choice correspondence is clearly a “tournament” as defined for instance 
in Moulin (1986) or more recently in Laslier (1997).     
In this paper we introduce a status-quo alternative that is selected when the act of choice 
from a subset of alternatives fails. This status-quo alternative is denoted by the empty set. 
When presented with a subset of alternatives a decision maker may either choose one or 
more alternatives from within the subset or he may choose the status-quo alternative. 
Opting for the status-quo conveys that no alternative from the menu of alternatives under 
consideration was selected.  
Two axioms that play a role in the more general context that we discuss here is the 
Chernoff axiom and Expansion. The Chernoff axiom says that if a chosen element from a 
set of alternatives is contained in a subset, then it is chosen from the subset as well. 
Expansion on the other hand says that if an alternative is chosen from two sets of 
alternatives then it is also chosen from their union. We are able to show that if a choice 
correspondence satisfies (weak) base domain property then satisfaction of Chernoff and 
Expansion is equivalent to it being (partially) rational. Further, if a choice function 
satisfies weak base domain property then satisfaction of Chernoff, Expansion and another 
property (Property A) is equivalent to it being partially almost transitive rational. A 
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binary relation is said to be almost transitive if given three alternatives, if the first is at 
least as good as the second and the second is at least as good as the third, then it is not the 
case that the third is preferred to the first. Property A says that if an alternative is revealed 
preferred to a second and the second revealed preferred to a third then given a choice 
between the first and the third, the first is definitely chosen. In this context we also 
discuss a property called T-Congruence due Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2006) and 
show that along with weak base domain property it implies (but is not necessarily implied 
by) partial almost transitive rationality. We also show that if the choice correspondence 
satisfies binary domain condition, then the satisfaction of Chernoff, Expansion and 
Property A is equivalent to transitive rationality. This follows as an immediate corollary 
of Proposition 2 in our paper. 
Another possible relaxation of transitive binary relation that we discuss here is almost 
quasi-transitivity. A binary relation is said to be almost quasi-transitive if given three 
alternatives, if the first is preferred to the second and the second is preferred to the third 
then it should not be that the third is at least as good as the first. In fact almost quasi-
transitivity is a generalization of quasi-transitivity. We show here that satisfaction of 
Chernoff, Expansion and another property (Property B) is equivalent to the choice 
function being partially almost quasi-transitive rational. Property B says that given three 
alternatives if in a pair-wise comparison between the first and second only the first is 
chosen and in a pair-wise comparison between the second and third only the second is 
chosen then the third is never revealed preferred to the first.         
There are several questions that come to mind at this juncture. The first concerns whether 
there is any significant difference between our framework of choice and the framework 
of choice where some subsets are exogenously given to be inadmissible. It is true that the 
results in both frameworks appear to be similar. However, in the framework discussed in 
this paper whether a given subset of alternatives allows choice to be made from within it 
or not, is not exogenously given; it is endogenous to the choice correspondence under 
consideration. In our framework a subset of alternatives may disallow choice in one 
choice correspondence while allow it for another. This is not the case if the collection of 
subsets from which choice is permitted is exogenously given and invariant with respect to 
the choice correspondence. It is also important to bear in mind that an assumption such as 
weak base domain property is not easily expressible except in the kind of framework 
discussed in this paper. 
The second question concerns the relevance of our general model of possibly empty 
choice sets in decision making problems. How does such a framework relate to real world 
decision making situations? In recent times behavioral economists have obtained 
evidence “from psychology, as well as casual observation and introspection” that “real-
life behavior often depends on observable information, other than the set of feasible 
alternatives, which is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives but 
nonetheless affects behavior”( Salant and Rubinstein (2008)). Such additional 
information is referred to as a frame and to the dependence on the frame as a framing 
effect. Both Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and an earlier paper by Bernheim and Rangel 
(2007) consider a choice function which given a frame, associates to each feasible set 
exactly one alternative from the feasible set. A choice correspondence in the traditional 
sense results when one associates with each feasible set all those alternatives from the 
feasible set that are chosen with respect to some frame. What if it were the case that the 
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frame based choice function (known in the literature as an extended choice function) 
instead of being single-valued was at most single-valued? Why is it imperative that for 
every frame the decision maker is able to make a choice from every set of feasible 
alternatives? Since the framing effect acts on the mind of the decision maker, it could at 
times compel the decision maker to opt for the status-quo rather than choose a feasible 
alternative. Received theory is remarkably silent on such a predicament that the decision 
maker may face. It is not as though the rationality of an extended choice function is not 
discussed. Salant and Rubinstein (2008) use the word “salient condition” to describe 
single-valued extended choice functions which are rational for each frame. What gets 
ignored in their research is that the extended choice function may more often than not be 
at most single valued rather than single-valued. The choice correspondences we study 
here may thus make a small contribution towards generalizing the concept of an extended 
choice function in order to make it appear more meaningful. Alternatively, this paper 
could be considered to be a possible extension of the received theory of choice functions 
on finite sets as summarized in Moulin (1984). 
 
2.   The Model 
 
 Let X be a non-empty finite set of alternatives and let P(X) denote the set of all non-
empty subsets of X. Let 2X denote the power set of X. 
A choice correspondence is a function C: P(X) → 2X such that (i) for all A∈P(X): C(A) 
⊂ A; (ii) for all x∈X: C({x}) = {x}. 
 
A choice function is a choice correspondence which is at most single valued.  
If C is a choice function then there exists a function c: P(X) → X∪{φ} such that (i) for all 
A∈P(X): (i) if C(A) ≠ φ, then C(A) = {c(A)}; (ii) if C(A) = φ, then c(A) = φ.  
 
Given a choice correspondence C (on X) let dom(C) denote the set {A∈P(X)/ C(A) ≠ φ}, 
i.e. the set of all non-empty subsets of X for which C is non-empty valued.  
Clearly for all x∈X: {x}∈dom(C).  






× , i.e. for all x,y∈X: 







× , i.e. for all x,y∈X: x *CR y if and only if there exists A∈P(X) such 






× , i.e. for all x,y∈X: xRCy if 
and only if x∈C({x,y}). 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to be partially rational if there exists a binary 
relation R on X satisfying the following: 
(1) R is reflexive: For all x∈X, xRx; 
(2) For all A∈dom(C) and x∈A: [x∈C(A)] if and only if [xRy for all y∈A]. 
In this case R is said to be a partial rationalization of C. 
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A partial rationalization R of C is said to be a rationalization of C if R is complete, i.e. 
for all x,y∈X with x ≠ y: either xRy or yRx. 
If a choice correspondence C has a rationalization then we say that it is rational.  
 
The original version of the following property is due to Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura 
(2006). 
 
Base Domain Property: A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy the Base Domain 
Property (BD) if for all x,y∈X:{x,y}∈ dom(C). 
 
In other words, the base domain property requires that the decision maker is able to 
choose from every two element set (and thus does not opt for the status-quo). 
 
A weaker version of the above property is the following: 
 
Weak Base Domain Property: A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy the Weak 
Base Domain property (WBD) if for all A∈P(X), x∈C(A) and y∈A with x ≠y: 
{x,y}∈dom(C). 
 
Three axioms that are well known in the choice theory literature are the following. 
 
Chernoff Axiom: A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy Chernoff Axiom (CA) if 
for all A∈P(X) and B∈ dom(C): [B ⊂ A] implies [C(A)∩B ⊂ C(B)]. 
 
Expansion (E): A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy Expansion (E) if for all 
A,B∈P(X) with A∪B∈dom(C): C(A)∩C(B) ⊂ C(A∪B). 
 
3.   Partial Rational Choice and Weak Base Domain Property 
 
Proposition 1: Let C be a choice correspondence satisfying WBD. Then C is partially 
rational if and only if C satisfies CA and E. 
 
Proof: Let C be a choice correspondence satisfying WBD. 
(a) Suppose C satisfies CA and E.  
 Let A∈dom(C).  
Let x∈C(A). Then xRCy for all y∈A. Thus C(A) ⊂ {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}.  
On the other hand if x∈A and xRCy for all y∈A, then for all y∈A there exists a set Ay∈ 
dom(C) such that y∈Ay and x∈C(Ay).  
By WBD, {x,y}∈dom(C) for all y∈A. 
By CA applied to Ay and {x,y} we get that x∈C({x,y}) for all y∈A. 








}),({ ⊂ C(A). 
Thus {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}⊂ C(A). 
Combining the two inclusions we get that C(A) = {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}. 
Clearly RC is reflexive. 
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Thus C is partially rational with RC being a partial rationalization of C.  
(b) In the other direction, suppose C is partially rational.  
Thus there exists a binary relation R on X satisfying the following: 
(1) R is reflexive: For all x∈X, xRx; 
(2) For all A∈dom(C) and x∈A: [x∈C(A)] if and only if [xRy for all y∈A]. 
Let A∈P(X) and B∈dom(C), B ⊂ A and x∈C(A)∩B.   
Thus A∈dom(C) and xRy for all y∈A. 
Hence xRy for all y∈B. 
Since C is partially rational with R being a partial rationalization, in view of B∈dom(C) 
we get x∈C(B). 
Thus C satisfies CA. 
Now let A,B∈P(X) with A∪B∈dom(C) and x∈C(A)∩C(B). Thus A,B∈dom(C). 
If y∈A then since x∈C(A) we get xRy. On the other hand if y∈B then since x∈C(B) we 
get xRy. Thus x∈ C(A∪B) and C(A)∩C(B) ⊂ C(A∪B).  
Thus C satisfies E. Q.E.D. 
 
While proving the above proposition we established the following result:   
Let C be a choice correspondence satisfying WBD. If C satisfies CA and E, then RC is a 
partial rationalization of C. 
 
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is the following: 
 
Corollary of Proposition 1: Let C be a choice correspondence satisfying BD. Then C is 
rational if and only if C satisfies CA and E. 
 
A binary relation R on X is said to be transitive if for all x,y,z∈X: [xRy & yRz] implies 
[xRz]. 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to be (partially) transitively rational if there exists a 
(partial) rationalization R of C that is transitive.  
 
We now provide an example of a choice correspondence that satisfies BD, CA and E but 
is not transitively rational. 
  
Example 1: Let X = {x,y,z,u}; C({a}) = {a} for all a∈X, C(A∪{u}) = {u} for all non-
empty subsets A of {x,y,z}, C({x,y}) = {x}, C({y,z}) = {y}, C(z,x}) = {z}, C({x,y,z}) = 
φ. It is easy to see that C satisfies BD, CA and E.  
Suppose R is any rationalization of C. Then R is not transitive since we have xRyRz but 
not xRz.  
 
4.   Partial Almost Transitive and Almost Quasi-Transitive Rationality  
  
Given a binary relation R on X let P(R) denote the asymmetric part of R (i.e. for all 
x,y∈X:xP(R)y if and only if xRy but not[yRx]) and I(R) its symmetric part (i.e. for all 
x,y∈X:xI(R)y if and only if xRy and [yRx]). 
 8 
 
A binary relation R on X is said to be almost transitive if there does not exist three 
distinct alternatives x,y,z ∈X such that xRy, yRz and zP(R)x. 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to be partially almost transitive rational if there exists 
a partial rationalization R of C that is almost transitive. 
 
Property A: A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy Property A if for all 
x, y, z∈X: [xRCy, yRCz and {x,z}∈dom(C)] implies [x∈C({x,z})]. 
 
Proposition 2: Let C be a choice correspondence that satisfies WBD. C is partially 
almost transitive rational if and only if C satisfies CA, E and Property A.  
 
Proof: Suppose C is a choice correspondence that satisfies WBD, CA, E and Property A. 
By the first three properties we get that C is partially rational with RC being a partial 
rationalization of C.  
Let x,y,z∈X with xRCy and yRCz. Towards a contradiction suppose that zP(RC)x. Thus 
zRCx. 
Hence there exists A∈dom(C) such that z∈C(A) and x∈A.  
By WBD, {x,z}∈dom(C).  
By Property A we get x∈C({x,z}) contradicting zP(RC)x.  
Thus RC is almost transitive rational.  
Now suppose C is partially almost transitive rational with R being the necessary partial 
almost transitive rationalization. 
Thus for all A∈dom(C): C(A) = {x∈A: xRy for all y∈A}. 
By Proposition 1, C satisfies CA and E. Let us show that C satisfies Property A. 
Let x, y, z∈X with xRCy, yRCz and {x,z}∈dom(C). Towards a contradiction suppose that 
x∉C({x,z}). Thus C({x,z}) = {z}. 
Hence zP(R)x.  
xRy, yRz and zP(R)x contradicts the almost transitivity of R. 
Thus C satisfies Property A. Q.E.D. 
 
The following corollary of Proposition 2 is easily established. 
 
Corollary of Proposition 2: Let C be a choice correspondence that satisfies BD. C is 
transitive rational if and only if C satisfies CA, E and Property A. 
 
In Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2006) we can find a stronger version of the Weak 
Congruence Axiom due to Richter (1966). This stronger version is referred to as T-
Congruence. 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy T-Congruence if for all x,y,z∈X and 
A∈dom(C): [xRCy, yRCz, x∈A and z∈C(A)] implies [x∈C(A)]. 
The special case where y = z corresponds to the definition of Weak Congruence. 
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Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2006) show that provided a choice correspondence 
satisfies BD it is transitive rational if and only if it satisfies T-Congruence. On the other 
hand, if we merely assume that a choice correspondence satisfies WBD then we cannot 
obtain such a strong result. What we can show is the following. 
 
Proposition 3: Let C be a choice function that satisfies WBD. If C satisfies T-
Congruence then it is almost transitively rational. The converse is however not true. 
  
Proof: Let C satisfy WBD and T-Congruence. Let A∈dom(C). 
If x∈C(A) then xRCy for all y∈A. Thus C(A) ⊂ {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}. 
Now suppose x∈A and xRCy for all y∈A.  
Since for all y∈A we have yRCy, it follows by T-Congruence that x∈C(A). 
Thus {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}⊂ C(A). 
Combining the two inclusions we get C(A) = {x∈A: xRCy for all y∈A}. 
Clearly RC is reflexive. Now let us show that RC is almost transitive. 
Let x,y,z ∈X with xRCy and yRCz. Towards a contradiction suppose that zP(RC)x. 
Then there exists A∈dom(C) such that z∈C(A) and x∈A\C(A). 
However [xRCy and yRCz, A∈dom(C), z∈C(A) and x∈A] implies by T-Congruence that 
[x∈C(A)], contradicting [x∈A\C(A)]. 
Thus not zP(RC)x and hence RC is almost transitive. 
Thus C is partially almost transitive rational. 
To show that the converse is not true let X = {x,y,z}. Let C({x,y}) = {x,y}, C({y,z}) = 
{y,z}, C({x,z}) = φ and C(X) = {y}. Clearly C is partially almost transitive rational with 
RC being the necessary partial almost transitive rationalization. However, C does not 
satisfy T-congruence since xRCy, yRCy, y∈C(X) and x∈X\C(X). Q.E.D. 
 
A binary relation R on X is said to be quasi-transitive if given x,y,z ∈X: [xP(R)y and 
yP(R)z] implies [zRx].  
A binary relation R on X is said to be almost quasi-transitive if there does not exist three 
distinct alternatives x,y,z ∈X such that xP(R)y, yP(R)z and zRx. 
 
It is easy to see that a binary relation that is almost transitive is also almost quasi-
transitive, though the converse need not be true. 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to be partially almost quasi-transitive rational if there 
exists a partial rationalization R of C that is almost quasi-transitive. 
 
Property B: A choice correspondence C is said to satisfy Property B if for all x, y, z∈X: 
[{x}= C({x,y}) &{y} = C({y,z})] implies [not zRCx].  
 
Proposition 4: Let C be a choice correspondence that satisfies WBD. C is partially 
almost quasi-transitive rational if and only if C satisfies CA, E and Property B. 
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Proof: Suppose C is a choice correspondence that satisfies WBD, CA, E and Property B. 
By the first three properties we get that C is partially rational with RC being a partial 
rationalization of C.  
Let x,y,z∈X with xP(RC)y, yP(RC)z. 
Thus there exists A,B∈dom(C) such that x∈C(A), y∈C(B)∩(A\C(A)) and z∈B\C(B). 
By WBD, {x,y}, {y,z}∈dom(C).  
By CA and xP(RC)y we get {x} = C({x,y}). 
By CA and yP(RC)z we get {y} = C({y,z}). 
Thus by Property B we get not zRCx. 
Thus RC is almost quasi-transitive.  
Now suppose C is partially almost quasi-transitive rational with R being the necessary 
partial almost quasi-transitive rationalization. 
Thus for all A∈dom(C): C(A) = {x∈A: xRy for all y∈A}. 
By Proposition 1, C satisfies CA and E. Let us show that C satisfies Property B. 
Let x, y, z∈X with {x}= C({x,y}) &{y} = C({y,z}). Towards a contradiction suppose 
that zRCx. 
Thus xP(R)y and yP(R)z and zRx, contradicting the almost quasi-transitivity of R. 
Hence C satisfies Property B. Q.E.D. 
 
A choice correspondence C is said to be quasi-transitive rational if there exists a 
rationalization R of C that is quasi-transitive. 
 
The following corollary of Proposition 4 is easy to establish. 
 
Corollary of Proposition 4: Let C be a choice correspondence that satisfies BD. C is 
quasi-transitive rational if and only if C satisfies CA, E and Property B. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have discussed choice correspondences that may be empty valued. This 
framework throws up possibilities that are absent in the classical framework of choice 
theory. This is only a modest beginning that has been made in a more general setting than 
what choice theory has been mainly concerned with. Much remains to be done if we want 
to understand fully the scope and nature of the kind of choice correspondences that we 
discuss here. 
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